








Canada can take action to reduce greenhouse gases while
minimizing the risk of getting out of line with the US on the cost 
of carbon emission permits.
NO. 307, AUGUST 2010
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONThe Canadian and American economies are inextricably intertwined through trade. As the
two countries debate plans to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, policymakers in both
countries must consider how emissions policies, such as an emissions trading system that sets
economy-wide limits on GHG emissions and allows firms to trade GHG emissions permits
for the right to pollute, might coexist. This Commentary analyzes the implications of linking
elements of potential Canadian and American GHG emissions trading systems, including
the scope of emissions covered by the systems, national emissions-reduction targets, emissions
permit prices, and cross-border trade of emissions permits. 
While Canada has chosen to harmonize emission targets with the United States, and
indicated an interest in following the US lead on emission trading, Canada has much more
to gain, or potentially lose, from linking policies.   
The economic rationale for linking the two countries’ permit trading systems is that Canada
now has the same short-term emissions reduction targets as the US. However, with these
targets, Canada’s abatement costs are likely to be higher than those in the US, owing to several
factors: faster growing emissions in Canada; fewer low-cost opportunities to reduce emissions
in the electricity sector due to a generation mix that already produces lower emissions; and
the high costs of emissions reductions in the oil and gas sector. Importing permits from the
US would equalize emissions permit prices, and lower the economic costs of emissions
reductions in Canada, but at the cost of large financial outflows to the US.
If Canada is indeed to seek deeper emissions cuts in the future, as Canada’s longer-term 2050
emissions reduction targets imply, innovation must be allowed to drive transformative
technologies. However, Canada-US trade in emissions permits would lower Canadian permit
prices, and hence returns to domestic innovations, particularly for carbon capture and storage
in the oil and gas sector. 
While GHG emissions legislation is at present going nowhere in the US Congress, and the US
has not expressed much interest in linking their policies with foreign emissions trading systems,
to wait for the US to legislate emissions policies would mean delay for Canada without any
guarantee that the eventual US approach would include linkages with Canada’s system.
Our assessment indicates that linked allowance trade with the US would not necessarily be
the best policy for Canada to pursue, as the US develops its own system. Instead, Canada
should forge ahead with its own system, while minimizing the risk of getting too far out of
step with the US on relative carbon prices. A policy of “go-it-alone” with similar carbon price
expectations, and a targeted innovation agenda, seems to be a low-risk strategy for Canada as
it develops its emissions policies. 
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T
he governments of Canada and
the United States have both
committed to support the
global effort to mitigate greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. Policymakers in
both countries are evaluating market-
based approaches to limit carbon
dioxide emissions, a major greenhouse
gas,
1 with some form of emissions
trading system (also known as cap-
and-trade) likely to become the
centerpiece of any GHG emissions
reduction strategy. 
Both countries already have emissions reductions
targets in place and both have proposed legislation
that enacts policy tools to reach these targets.
The two countries have close economic ties, and
both sides see potential benefits from efforts to link
their emissions trading programs or possibly even to
develop a North American emissions permit market
that would enable cross-border permit trading.
Indeed, each country may be wary of undertaking
unilateral actions without some kind of comparable
effort by its major trade partners. These two
economies have quite different characteristics,
however, and it would be wise to understand them
before attempting to design compatible climate
policies and deciding whether and how to link them.
In this Commentary, we discuss climate policies that
have been put forward in both countries and model
the expected economic effect of these policies to
predict the national and sector-level impacts of linked
Canada-US permit
2 trade. Canada can greatly reduce
the economic cost of reducing GHGs by linking with
the United States, but there are challenges. Rather than
linking Canadian and US permit trading systems,
Canada should keep permit prices comparable through
a price ceiling matched to the US price. This approach
would do the most to reduce economic costs and
prepare Canada to develop needed low-carbon
technology required for the long term.
The Climate Policies that Might be Linked
Although neither country yet has a federal emissions
trading program in place, recent proposals may give
some clues to the potential forms of future climate
regulation. Emissions trading systems of GHG
emissions permits (also known as allowances) have a
variety of important design options that can
influence the costs and benefits of linking two
systems with different policies. These options range
from the stringency of the emissions reductions
targets, to the banking and borrowing provisions
attached to permits, to other cost-control
mechanisms. We begin with a brief review of the
current proposals in the United States and Canada,
and then discuss various ETS design options.
Current US Proposals
The American Clean Energy and Security Act, 2009
(ACESA, also known as H.R. 2454 or Waxman-
Markey) passed the US House of Representatives on
June 26, 2009. Among other provisions not directly
related to greenhouse gases, the bill proposes a cap-
and-trade system to reduce carbon emissions by the
year 2020 to a level that is 17 percent below the
2005 levels, with significantly greater reductions
thereafter. The proposed cap-and-trade system
would cover the entire economy, using a hybrid of
downstream regulation of large emitters,
3 such as
power plants, and upstream regulation of
transportation and other fuels. In this context,
upstream regulation caps emissions from fossil fuels
where they first enter the economy – at the refinery,
natural gas distributor, or at the border – and
downstream regulation caps emissions from those
fuels and industrial processes at the plant. 
Income generated from the sale of allowances is to
be earmarked for a variety of uses, including transfers
to low-income households, transitional assistance for
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The authors wish to thank Ben Dachis of the C.D. Howe Institute, Erica Myers of Resources for the Future for research support, and Chris
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1 In this paper, we will refer equivalently to emissions, GHGs, carbon and carbon dioxide, and carbon dioxide equivalent. 
2 We use the terms “permit” and “allowance” interchangeably. A permit allows its holder to emit 1 tonne of CO2 equivalent.
3 ACESA defines large emitters as stationary sources emitting more than 25,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually.4 ACESA leaves the formula for these distributions up to the Administration.
5 These are industries that face the dual problem of cost increases from a cap-and-trade system and competition with importers from countries
not facing a carbon price, who thereby gain a competitive advantage. ACESA defines EITE sectors as manufacturing sectors – at the detailed 
6-digit level of the North American Industrial Classification (NAICS) Code – for which energy (or potential GHG) costs exceed 5 percent of
the value of their shipments and for which imports and exports exceed 15 percent of total production plus imports, or for which energy costs
exceed 20 percent of total value of shipments. Refineries are excluded. Approximately 33 sectors would be presumptively eligible, mostly
primary goods manufacturers like steel, lime, cement, glass, pulp and paper, chemicals, etc.
6 Credits are not permits allocated under the cap, but come from outside the cap. Until 2018, one offset credit is equal to one allowance then
1.25 credits equals one allowance.
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firms facing high costs for emissions reductions,
technology research, adapting to the possible
consequences of climate change, and ultimately
deficit reduction. Allowances may be auctioned off
to the various sectors or given out freely. Thirty-five
percent of the allowances would be allocated to the
electricity sector, but to electricity distributors known
as load distribution companies (LDCs) rather than
utilities, because, as regulated entities, the LDCs
must pass on the allowance values to customers in
the form of lower retail bills. Refineries would be
allocated  2.5 percent of allowances under the
emissions cap, roughly equivalent to half of their
direct emissions.
4 Some US industries that consume
high levels of energy may have difficulties competing
on the world stage if they are constrained by caps
while their international competitors are not. These
energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITE)
manufacturing sectors
5 would receive up to 15
percent of the cap, but in the form of output-based
rebates designed to mitigate the risk of emissions
leakage from lost competitive-ness. Firms in these
sectors would receive allowances in proportion to
their production, with the per-unit allocation equal
to the industry (as opposed to their own) average
emissions, offsetting (on average) the cost of
emission allowances. This would keep marginal
production costs from rising while preserving the
incentive of the carbon price to reduce emissions
intensity. 
In later years, and at the discretion of the
President, provisions would allow these rebates to
be replaced gradually by border carbon
adjustments on imports from foreign producers in
the same EITE manufacturing sectors as domestic
producers. This would entail a charge on
imported goods equivalent to the costs imposed on
domestic producers for carbon emissions.
However, the President would have some
discretion over whether to initiate the program and
what its details would be,  since the basis for these
adjustments and conditions for application are not
well defined in the legislation. Provisions would
offer exemptions to countries that are (i) party to
binding international agreements to reduce GHG
emissions (along with the US) and have economy-
wide reduction measures of comparable stringency;
(ii) that have sectoral agreements; or (iii) that have
lower emissions intensities in those sectors.
Several provisions allow for cost smoothing and
cost containment over time. Companies would be
able to save unused allowances from one year to use
in another (allowance bankability). Within limits,
they might also be allowed to borrow against
allowances they expect to receive in future years.
These provisions are intended to prevent large
swings in permit  prices from year to year. Another
provision, the strategic allowance reserve, enables
the government to set aside small percentages of the
allowances in reserve for future use. These
allowances would be made available for emitters to
purchase if prices spiked over 160 percent of a 36-
month rolling average daily reserve price. 
Analysis by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and Energy Information Agency
(EIA) indicates that generous carbon offset
provisions contribute the most toward keeping
expected prices low (between $16-32 per tonne of
CO2 in 2020). With a carbon offset, instead of
reducing its own carbon emissions, an entity may
comply with its carbon emissions cap by
providing funds to another entity that is
conducting a project that reduces carbon
emissions. ACESA sets an annual ceiling for
offsets of two billion credits
6 (or about 40 percent
of the cap). One billion credits are to come from
domestic sources, primarily agricultural
sequestration practices that trap carbon in
agricultural plants or soils. The remaining credits
are to come from international sources, primarily
through reduced emissions from deforestation and
degradation (REDD), a program that provides
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international offsets. International credits equating
to 1.5 billion tonnes of emissions may be substi-
tuted for an equal amount of domestic credits.
7
Similar policy parameters to ACESA were put
forward in now-defunct  companion legislation in
the Senate, the American Power Act (APA) which
was submitted by Senators Kerry and Lieberman
on May 10, 2010). The cap-and-trade provisions
in the APA looked very similar to the ACESA with
respect to coverage, stringency, sectoral allocations,
and treatment of EITE sectors. Some minor
differences included the emission sources covered
by the cap, and some variations in sectoral
allowance allocations. A material difference was a
price collar that limited the trading range for
allowances, had called for a floor price of $12
(increasing at 3 percent annually in real terms) and
a ceiling price at $25 (increasing at 5 percent
annually in real terms). The treatment of
downstream emissions from transportation fuels
also included measures to keep those prices more
stable. More detail on the specific differences is
provided in Table 1.
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7 ACESA also includes many provisions unrelated to the cap-and-trade program, including a federal renewable energy standard for electricity
generation, energy efficiency measures, and support for a variety of clean energy technologies.
Table 1: Canadian and US Climate Policies in 2020
Source: Authors’ interpretation of US and Canada legislation.
Canada: New Targets and some
elements of Turning the Corner 
US: ACESA, 2009
H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey)
US: American Power Act, 2010
S. 1733 (Kerry-Lieberman)
Target 17 percent below 2005 (new
target), modeled as a hard cap; 20
percent below 2006 – (old target).
17 percent below 2005, hard cap. 17 percent below 2005, hard cap.
Allowance Trading
Coverage
Industrial energy users and
producers  (electricity, oil & gas,
energy-intensive manufacturing);
~42 percent of current national
emissions, no fixed process
emissions.
Economy-wide (upstream coverage 
of fossil fuels and downstream coverage
of heavy emitters); ~85 percent in 
2020 of all emissions.
Economy-wide (upstream coverage
of fossil fuels and downstream
coverage of heavy emitters); ~85
percent in 2020 of all emissions.
Flexibility
Mechanisms
Technology Fund created, but
phased out prior to 2020.
Banking, borrowing, Strategic Allowance
Reserve created to limit price volatility
(starting at $28/tonne).
Banking, borrowing, cost




No domestic limit. International
offsets can be no more than 10
percent of compliance.
2 billion tonne limit, 40 percent of
compliance, split 50/50, although
international offsets can rise to 1.5 billion 
if domestic offsets are limited; After 2018,
1.25 international offset credits must be
submitted for each equivalent allowance. 
2 billion tonne limit annually, 75
percent domestic and 25 percent
international. After 2018, 1.25
international offset credits must be
submitted for each equivalent
allowance.
Allocation Allocation plans not announced.
We assume free allocation to
covered entities based on historic
emissions (but likely on emission
intensity).
After phase-in, output-based for EITE
sectors (15 percent) and, in effect, for
electricity (35 percent) and natural gas
distribution companies (8.8 percent);
grandfathering for refineries (2.25 percent);
most of remainder is auctioned  but with
revenues earmarked.
After phase-in, output-based for
EITE sectors (15 percent) and, in
effect, for electricity (35 percent)
and natural gas distribution
companies (9 percent); transpor-
tation efficiency (9.2 percent);
refiners (3.75 percent); and
strategic reserve (1.5 percent). 8 Facilities with emissions greater than 50 kilotonnes CO2e:  CO2e (CO2 equivalent) is the globally accepted unit to measure the global warming
potential of greenhouse gases. TTC proposed to cover the following sectors: fossil fuel electricity generators, petroleum refineries, heavy crude
oil and bitumen upgraders, oil and gas producers, processors and transmission, chemical production, cement and lime production, iron and
steel plants, metal smelters and processors, some large mines, and pulp and paper facilities.
9 As evidenced by the Government of Canada’s document: A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation 
Act – 2010. In this document there is no reference to The Regulatory Framework and no policies moving forward.
http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&xml=AD9054AB-6F3E-4A78-9557-E4010A980D92
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In the meantime, climate regulation continues
simultaneously on two other paths in the US. At
the federal government level, the EPA is going
forward with GHG regulations, following a court
finding that GHGs endanger human health and
the environment, thus enabling the EPA to
regulate GHG emissions. Under the auspices of
the Clean Air Act, the agency has been drafting
emissions standards and regulations for vehicles
and developing regulations that apply to large
facilities that emit GHGs. It is unclear whether the
EPA, in the absence of Congressional legislation,
could create an emissions trading scheme, but the
regulatory option provides a credible backstop for
the Administration’s commitments in the
Copenhagen Accord, as well as some encourage-
ment to Congress to legislate a more cost-effective
solution than the type of regulations the EPA can
enact. Many regions and states have also launched
initiatives. Several states are engaged in emissions
trading programs: the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) is already underway among a
block of northeastern states, with some Canadian
provinces as observers; the Western Climate
Initiative, which also includes some Canadian
provinces, is planning a trading system, as is
California. Midwestern states are exploring similar
cooperation on climate policies. 
Current Canadian Proposals
In 2007, the Canadian government unveiled
Turning the Corner: an Action Plan to Reduce
Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution (hereafter
referred to as the TTC plan), which aimed to
reduce GHG emissions to 20 percent below 2006
levels by 2020 and between 60 to 70 percent below
2006 levels by 2050. Although little policy
implementation has happened since then, that
same year the government issued its Regulatory
Framework on Air Emissions (which was to
implement elements of the TTC plan). It proposes
intensity-based standards – regulations that cap
the amount of emissions per unit of output – for
existing Canadian large industrial emitters.
8 Its
target:  a GHG reduction of 18 percent below the
2006 emissions intensity by 2012, and then a 2
percent annual improvement thereafter. Thus, no
hard cap is placed on emissions. Instead, the
intensity standard allows overall emissions to grow
while reducing the intensity of production. 
Compliance options for firms include:
abatement; permit purchases and sales between
regulated entities; domestic offsets; and credits
from the international Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), an emissions offset provision
of the Kyoto Protocol. These options are available
for up to 10 percent of a single entity’s compliance.
Until 2017, rather than reducing emissions or
purchasing offsets, entities may also pay an
equivalent amount to a technology fund that
supports innovative ways to develop and
disseminate technologies to reduce GHG
emissions. Coverage under the regulatory
framework includes  about 50 percent of Canada’s
national emissions inventory. 
The regulatory framework provides a three-year
exemption from mandated reductions in
greenhouse gas intensity for new facilities that begin
operation after the regulations are introduced,
followed by a requirement of a 2 percent annual
improvement. New coal-fired electricity plants, in
situ bitumen extraction facilities, and facilities that
convert bitumen into synthetic crude oil
(upgraders) to be built after 2012 are required to
meet a carbon capture and storage greenhouse gas
intensity standard, meaning they must use carbon
capture and storage technology or meet the
equivalent emissions intensity  by 2018.
The TTC plan was shelved in 2009, with no clear
policy guidance on a path forward.
9 In January 2010,
the government of Canada harmonized GHG
reduction targets with the US, to 17 percent below
2005 levels in 2020. This had the effect of weakening
Canada’s targets by about  32 Megatonnes (Mt). 10 Canada is the largest or second-largest source of US imports and exports in emissions-intensive industries such as paper, aluminum, iron and
steel, chemicals and cement  (Interagency Report, 2009).
11 For a general review of issues in linking emissions trading systems, see e.g., Jaffe and Stavins (2007) and Flachsland et al. (2009).
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By examining the current behavior of the
Canadian government, we can predict future
policy directions. The government of Canada in
recent years has demonstrated a desire to
accommodate relatively unfettered growth of
industrial emissions and has been particularly
supportive of increased oil sands development.
These desires are likely to be central to future
policy directions. Closely aligned elements include
some form of technology fund to act as a safety
valve, i.e., with a maximum price on emissions
permits and revenues ultimately funding research
and pilot projects to develop low-carbon
technologies such as carbon capture and storage
capabilities in the oil sector. Finally, much of the
debate in Canada hinges on concerns over
competitiveness impacts with the United States.
The lack of action in the United States has been
and continues to be an oft-cited reason for Canada
to delay action of its own. The perceived threat of
US border measures, California’s low carbon fuel
standard, and regulations on the GHG-intensity of
motor fuels has underscored this concern. 
In looking to the future, one can envision a new
policy based on TTC, but with some sort of hard cap,
similar to the one envisioned in the United States. A
technology fund is likely to figure prominently, with
output-based allocations to help energy-intensive and
trade-exposed sectors. Future targets and policy
elements may emphasize policy similarities and
eventual permit trading with the United States. 
However, while a US system would apply to the
entire economy as currently envisaged, the same is
not the case in Canada. Transportation and
buildings account for about 36 percent of the
national carbon emission inventory in Canada, but
it is unclear whether the Canadian government
intends to put emissions caps on these sectors. This
presents an obvious distinction between US and
Canadian climate policy proposals. Another contrast
in policy concerns permit auctioning. The United
States intends to eventually auction permits, and
thus collect government revenues from emissions
permits, whereas there is no mention of permit
auctioning in Canadian policy circles.
Fundamentals of Linking
The case for linking is much the same as the case for
choosing a cap-and-trade system in the first place:
economic efficiency. To achieve an economy-wide
reduction in carbon emissions at the lowest possible
economic cost, it is infeasible to demand identical
reductions from all regulated entities. To do this
would ignore important cost differences among the
actors, which may comprise power plants of
different vintages and fuels, a variety of manufac-
turers, or households with different energy needs.
Instead, the cap-and-trade program asks all these
actors to meet the goal collectively and cost-
effectively, by sending a common price signal in the
form of the market value of carbon allowances.
Lower cost actors can take more reductions in return
for lower carbon allowance costs, while higher cost
actors can comply by surrendering more allowances
rather than taking on costlier reductions. 
The rationale of gains from trade is similar from
an international perspective, in which countries
that have very different energy and industry
structures can face very different costs to achieve
the same reduction target. In this case, the high-
cost country gains by purchasing allowances, 
rather than by reducing its own emissions further. 
The low-cost country gains from increasing its
abatement in return for the allowance values. 
The same collective target can be met more cost-
effectively when marginal abatement costs are
equalized across countries. 
Aside from the economic efficiency argument,
linking carbon-trading systems may also promote
operational efficiency, because harmonized com-
pliance regimes can facilitate business transactions for
multinationals and ease cross-border trade. Canada
trades at least two-thirds of its energy intensive
manufactured goods with the United States.
10
Linking carbon-trading systems has implications
on other activities as well, including the
distributional effects of climate policies, capital
flows, the terms of trade, and the management of
cost uncertainty and price volatility. These
implications may well differ for a small country
compared to a large one.
1112 2008 GDP data from the World Bank and 2007 emissions data from the UNFCCC.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf
http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do 
13 Taylor and Copeland (2005) also point out that trade, by raising incomes in low-cost countries, can increase demand for addressing
environmental problems like climate change. 
14 See, e.g., Fischer (2005).
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The Price Effects of Linking
Ultimately, most of the effects of linking relate
directly or indirectly to the carbon price changes
experienced by the partner countries. Therefore, it
is important to understand how linking affects
these prices.
As just discussed, linked cap-and-trade regimes
exploit the gains from trade created by the price
differences between markets. As a result, emissions
are reallocated across the two economies, flowing
from the low-cost to the high-cost country. The
market price of allowances will find a new
equilibrium in between the unlinked prices, but in
general, it will stay closer to that of the larger
market and move farther away from the market
with the more steeply rising abatement costs. In the
North American case, the United States is 10 times
the size of Canada in terms of both GDP and
GHG emissions.
12 Consequently, one can expect
the US carbon market to drive allowance prices. 
The sensitivity of the carbon price depends not
only on the size of the dominant market, but also
on critical climate-policy design choices that can
keep marginal abatement costs from rising too
sharply. These design choices – such as offsets for
emission-reducing activities outside the cap, as well
as price-control mechanisms like a price ceiling –
help moderate allowance prices, but raise
additional issues for linked systems.
Before we discuss these choices in turn, we note
that trade theory suggests that pressures exist to
equalize carbon prices even in the absence of
linking, due to trade in other goods (Taylor and
Copeland 2005). Without linking, emissions-
intensive production would gradually relocate
toward the lower cost country, driving up carbon
prices there, while the high-cost country would
shift more toward low-carbon production,
bringing down abatement costs. Thus, if emissions
are not reallocated through allowance trade, output
is ultimately reallocated through goods trade,
bringing carbon prices closer together in the long
run.
13 Linking – or other policy choices –
harmonizes prices in the short run, mitigating
pressures to reallocate production.
Offsets
Offsets provide credits for emissions reductions
taken outside the cap, to be used for compliance
under the cap. They leverage the power of the
carbon market to create incentives for reductions in
sectors and countries that are otherwise unregulated.
The rationale is similar to that of trading: to access
low-cost emissions reduction opportunities wherever
they are. However, these project-based mechanisms
remain controversial because it is difficult to account
for the reductions, which involves estimating an
unverifiable baseline of what would have happened
in the absence of the project.
14Thus, the emissions
consequences are less certain, and over-allocation of
credits means an erosion of the integrity of the
emissions cap. On the other hand, many of these
mechanisms are seen as essential to a transition in
which developing countries take on greater roles in
carbon emissions mitigation. 
ACESA includes a generous system of offsets
from domestic agricultural sequestration and
international credits for reduced emissions from
deforestation and degradation (REDD) that
together can reach up to 40 percent of the cap.
However, not all countries may have the same
preferences for offset systems. For example, the
European Union’s emissions trading systems allows
compliance credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM,
but not from REDD. The US reliance on large
quantities of international offsets differs significantly
from Canada, where the TTC plan allowed only 10
percent of compliance to come from the CDM. 
It is not possible to link to an emissions trading
system without linking to the offsets associated
with it. Linking implies that the weakest standard
for offsets becomes the de facto rule. For example,
if Canada barred Canadian firms from using
REDD credits, while the US recognized them, USfirms could purchase REDD credits for
compliance and sell their own US allowances to
Canadian firms for compliance. The net effect is
the same as allowing Canadian firms to buy
REDD credits directly. Thus, governments
concerned about stringency need to be aware of all
such measures and determine whether they are
mutually acceptable. 
Other Cost-Containment Measures
Cost-containment measures affect both the relative
costs of the unilateral emissions trading systems
and their price sensitivity. Cap levels are the key
determinant of allowance prices. By extension,
they govern the size of the efficiency gains and the
distributional effects from linking. However, other
design aspects, such as price ceilings and floors, as
well as offset systems, also affect the degree to
which carbon prices may rise or fall.
As mentioned above, a safety valve is a ceiling on
the price of allowances. ACESA provides for a
Strategic Allowance Reserve that will auction
additional allowances if prices spike above a certain
level, with the proceeds dedicated to buying
REDD offsets. The APA has a fixed, rather than
rolling, price ceiling. In Canada, there is discussion
of a safety valve, with payments going into a
technology fund. There is a potential cost to safety
valves. By limiting the possibility of high allowance
prices, the incentive to invest in low-carbon
technological innovations is also limited. A price
collar, which combines a price ceiling with a price
floor, effectively creates a trading band that limits
price deviations in both directions. Thus,
unacceptably high allowance price outcomes are
avoided, but low price outcomes are also avoided,
allowing for additional reductions when they are
cheap and ensuring a minimum incentive for
investments. This option was included in the APA.
In a linked system, when a safety valve or price
collar binds, it binds the whole system. In this
manner, a small system can have a large effect if it has
a lower safety valve price than the larger emissions
trading system. Safety valves have the potential to
trigger large financial transfers to the auctioning
government, which can raise political questions. In
linking, governments may want to consider
harmonizing safety valves or price collars and
allocating the resulting revenues across jurisdictions. 
In sum, it is difficult to link and only select
components of a partner’s cap-and-trade system.
Linking leads to de facto harmonization of all cost-
containment measures. The only way to prevent any
linking-induced increase in the use of cost-
containment measures is to establish a system, such
as a one-way link, that prevents net sales of any
allowances from the more generous system. Other
potential restrictions include some of those we see in
offset systems: restrictions on the quantity of
allowances that can be sold into or purchased from
another system, an exchange rate of allowances other
than one-to-one, or fees that make one system more
expensive to use. Restrictions could also depend on
whether the safety valve is used. Although these
kinds of transaction costs and restrictions on
intersystem trading may be necessary, they may also
reduce cost savings from linking.
Distributional Effects of Lower Prices
Changing carbon prices affect more than just the
location of emissions; linking to the United States
results in lower carbon prices for Canada for a
comparable emissions target.
On the one hand, lower carbon prices mean
lower compliance costs for abating industries and,
thus, generally smaller adverse impacts on
production and employment in energy-intensive
sectors. On the other hand, they also mean lower
values for any allowances that are allocated to
industries, meaning smaller windfall profits for net
owners of allowances. Meanwhile, other sectors
that rely on higher carbon prices for their
profitability – renewable and other low-carbon
energy sources, carbon capture and sequestration,
energy-saving technologies, advanced technology
research, and domestic agricultural offset 
programs – become less profitable.
For consumers, lower carbon prices mean lower
energy costs. They also mean reduced incentives to
conserve energy or to invest in energy efficiency,
including energy-saving appliances, weatherization,
and fuel-efficient vehicles. If households receive
rebates, dividends, or lower taxes from the
allowance revenues, those values also diminish.
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For the government, lower prices mean fewer
revenues from allowance auctions. Because these
auctions fund investments in energy efficiency and
clean energy technologies, which are essential to
meet long-term targets, it would be necessary to
find additional funding sources, which can place
additional burdens on government budgets.
Revenue Flows
Linking also affects financial flows across countries.
Whether through revenues from trade or from
auctioned allowances, capital will flow from the
high-cost country to the low-cost one. In the case
of auctioned allowances, this could mean a transfer
of wealth to a foreign government. This transfer is
less expensive than requiring domestic firms to
perform additional reductions, but there may be
political resistance to such capital flows.
Alternative designs can allow for some of the
benefits of linking without the corresponding
transfers. For example, a comparable safety valve
(allowance price cap linked to the price in the
partner country) achieves the same domestic
reductions while keeping revenues at home.
However, unless the revenues are used to buy
additional offsets elsewhere, the global emissions
consequences are not the same. 
Stringency
The benefits and distributional effects of linking
depend on the size of the price differential between
two emissions trading systems. However, the size of
this differential is closely intertwined with the
stringency of the targets: a high carbon price may
reflect higher domestic abatement costs, or it may
reflect a more stringent policy. This motivation may
be politically important for linking, since a country
that adopts ambitious targets may question seeking
low-cost allowances from a country with weak
targets. One can also consider the reverse situation;
a country in which high carbon prices are
politically unacceptable may hesitate to forge a link
that will drive up allowance prices.
Linking may also change the incentives for
partner countries to set targets in the future. For
example, when a country acts alone, more stringent
targets always mean higher costs. However, with
linking, allowance prices become less sensitive to the
stringency of the targets – and potentially insensitive
to those set by a relatively small country. A side
effect of this price insensitivity is that domestic
emissions also decouple from the domestic target,
since they are determined by the carbon price.
Linking also creates some countervailing
incentives. For example, it might be possible for
one government to adopt more stringent domestic
targets by linking, because linking ensures that
domestic carbon prices would not rise accordingly.
(In a sense, this is the role foreseen for
international offsets in ACESA). On the other
hand, if the primary concern of domestic
policymakers is  the net costs of a policy, they may
prefer to relax their emissions targets, which does
not greatly affect domestic abatement but does
reduce the need to import allowances – or increase
the supply of allowances for export. If a country is
a large enough player in the market, relaxing its
targets also drives down prices, which is less desired
by a seller of allowances. Net sellers of emissions
allowances particularly want to avoid situations in
which other trading systems relax their caps in
order to get additional revenue from linkage
(Helm 2003; Rehdanz and Tol 2005). 
In the absence of international cooperation, the
likely net effect of these strictly economic
incentives is to increase total emissions. In this
case, even though there are efficiency gains from
trade, the policy becomes less economically
efficient due to the setting of inefficiently low
abatement levels (Holtsmark and Sommervoll
2008). Thus, in linked systems, strategies for target
setting may require careful scrutiny and additional
negotiations to ensure stringency.
Price Volatility
Unlike emissions taxes, cap-and-trade programs
allow the carbon prices to be set by markets, which
are subject to a variety of shocks that could push
prices up and down. For example, an unusually
hot summer or cold winter can drive up energy
demand, causing carbon prices to rise. An
economic recession can relax demand for carbon
allowances. Energy supply shocks are also likely to
affect carbon prices.Commentary 307 | 9
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15 The Fischer Fox Emissions and Trade (FFEAT) model is a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model; that is, it does not project forward,
but represents how economies respond to climate policies from a base year of 2004. The scenario takes the real carbon price from EIA (2009) central
scenario, and includes output-based allocations for energy intensive, trade-exposed sectors and in the electricity sector, which mimics allocations to
the load distribution companies. In the absence of these allocations, the competitiveness impacts for energy-intensive manufacturing would be larger.
Linking broadens the overall carbon market,
which may then offer some diversification that can
reduce price volatility. On the other hand, linking
also means that cost shocks in one part of the
system transmit throughout the linked system,
exposing each country to volatility in the other
systems. Thus, domestic price shocks can find an
outlet abroad, which can have a stabilizing effect
on prices at home, but foreign price shocks will
also be felt at home. 
Given that the Canadian market would be much
smaller on its own, particularly if it focuses only on
large final emitters, linking has the potential to
improve market liquidity. On the other hand, with
linking, price volatility would be driven largely by
the larger US market.
If price shocks – particularly due to energy supply
and demand changes – correlate across the
economies, linking is unlikely to dampen overall
price volatility. The United States and Canada, for
example, have integrated natural gas markets and
common weather patterns, meaning energy shocks
can often hit both partners simultaneously. In
contrast, Europe relies on differentiated natural gas
markets and is influenced by different weather
systems. Thus, linking with the European Union’s
Emissions Trading System (ETS) would be likely to
provide more diversification in the emissions trading
portfolio than linking in North America.
Terms of Trade
A less obvious effect of linkage is on the terms of
trade, the value of exports relative to imports.
Emission pricing reduces demand and prices for
fossil fuels; thus, it tends to reduce the terms of
trade in fossil-fuel exporting regions. In this manner,
an increase in US emissions prices can deteriorate
Canadian terms of trade as an energy exporter.
Meanwhile, one would expect the prices of energy
intensive manufactured goods to rise. For exporters
of other goods implementing their own emissions
pricing, the reduction in domestic consumption and
imports can improve the terms of trade (Farmer et
al. 2008). However, the net effect depends on the
composition of imports and exports. Alexeeva-
Talebi and Anger (2007) find that member states of
the European Union (EU) improve their terms of
trade by integrating with (and importing allowances
from) emerging ETS, while all non-EU linking
candidates face competiveness losses by linking up,
as they see their costs rise. 
The strongest effects on the terms of trade are
from the domestic climate policies themselves.
Canada will see the value of its energy exports
change, regardless of whether the systems are
linked. Linking, alone, would only have a
significant influence on the terms of trade if it
would substantially change emissions prices.
Linked without Linking
These two facts are key: (a) the primary effects come
from the climate policies themselves, while linking is
secondary, and (b) Canada and the United States
have closely linked economies, regardless of whether
they link their emissions trading systems.
Approximately 80 percent of Canadian exports go
to the United States, including exports from energy
intensive sectors, and 70 percent of Canadian
imports come from the United States.
As a result, US climate policy will have
significant effects on Canada, regardless of
Canada’s own climate policy. If we consider US
policy to always operate in the background for
Canadian policy, it is useful to understand what
those baseline effects are. The results of a
simulation from the FFEAT model
15 of the US
implementing a stylized version of ACESA on
different sectors in the United States and Canada
provide sector-level estimates of economic effects
(Figure 1). This model assumes no linkage between
Canada and the United States. In this simulation,
energy-intensive sectors in Canada would benefit
from the US policy, which would improve
Canadian competitiveness, while some would lose,
namely the extractive sectors that would face
reduced demand from a carbon-constrained US
economy. Production in energy-intensive
manufacturing sectors would not be greatly| 10 Commentary 307
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affected in either country, because of the output-
based allocations proposed in ACESA, which
would keep product prices stable. The Canadian
transport sector would benefit from falling oil
prices, because US demand would drop. Overall,
the effect of US policy on Canada would be
positive but negligible.
A variety of other climate-related policies in the
United States may affect Canada. A renewable
energy standard would affect electricity trade and
prices. Widespread adoption of California’s low-
carbon fuel standard (LCFS) would affect oil
industries, particularly the more emissions-
intensive oil sands. Several aspects of the cap-and-
trade design, including the scope of sector coverage
and the choice of allowance allocation
mechanisms, can be expected to affect the
competitiveness of these sectors and the efficiency
of the overall emissions trading system. 
These spillover effects from US policy remain,
whether the Canadian policy baseline includes
carbon regulation or not. Furthermore, linking will
not change these spillover effects unless it moves
the US price significantly. On the other hand,
linking does have the potential to change the
effects of Canadian policy, if (as many suspect) it
does have a significant effect on the Canadian
carbon price. In the next section, we explore the
potential effects in Canada of linking emissions
trading between Canada and the United States.
Modeling Linked Canada-US
Emissions Trading Systems
To explore the implications of linking a Canadian
emissions trading system to the presumed US
system, we proceeded in two steps. First, we use a
cross-border allowance trade model. This partial
equilibrium model uses sector-abatement-cost
estimates in both Canada and the United States to
determine aggregate emissions reductions, allowance
prices, allowance flows across borders, and total
costs under a number of alternative scenarios.
Second, we used a computable general equilibrium
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Figure 1: Changes in Production from Unilateral US Emissions Reduction Target of 20 percent
Source: Authors’ calculations from FFEAT model.Commentary 307 | 11
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16 Allowance payments are included in GDP because we are tracking GDP at basic price, which includes indirect taxes. 
alternative scenarios on Canada in 2020. We do not
model the US macroeconomic effects of linked
allowance trade, but these are likely to be less
significant, given that bilaterally traded allowances
will account for a small share of US emissions. In
the Appendix, we discuss the models used in detail. 
The Outcomes that Matter 
We use a common set of assessment criteria to
assess the implications of alternative Canada and
US climate policies. The important national and
sector impacts of the policies include total
emissions reductions, allowance prices, total
compliance costs, revenue transfers between
countries and sectors, and macroeconomic and
competitiveness impacts. More specifically: 
￿  Compliance and emission reductions. Under
each scenario, we assessed a mix of compliance
options by sector. Abatement may be
conducted, or allowances can be purchased,
through trade with other firms and countries,
indirect reductions from domestic and
international offsets, or flexibility mechanisms
such as technology funds or strategic reserves
that, depending on how revenue is spent, may
or may not deliver emission reductions. 
￿  Costs. These include two metrics,  (a) the
allowance price, which is the equilibrium price
of carbon that emerges under each policy
through trading and is a function of stringency,
coverage, flexibility mechanisms, and relative
abatement costs and (b) compliance costs,
which include expenditures on abatement
including offsets, measured as the area under
the cost curve for given prices and quantities,
and net expenditures on allowances, credits, or
other flexibility mechanisms. 
￿  Macroeconomic impacts. These include
impacts on (a) gross domestic product, which
indicates the level of macroeconomic activity
under each scenario, including the impact of
compliance payments between sectors and
countries,
16 (b) gross output, which is a measure
of the total economic output for the sector, and
(c) net exports, which indicate how trade with
rest of the world is affected by the policy.
Linking Scenarios 
There is considerable uncertainty about how
Canadian and US climate policy will proceed.
New targets have been announced in Canada, yet
the architecture of how these targets will be met
remains uncertain, whereas in the US, competing
climate policies are continually emerging. In this
section we start with stylized versions of recently
proposed climate policies in both countries and
then explore possible options that might emerge,
including cross-border permit trade. We assess
variations on three scenarios: 
(1) Same  targets but different policies. 
Under this scenario, we explore the current
reduction targets and main elements of
recent Canadian and US climate policy
proposals. While Canada has harmonized its
targets with the US, at 17 percent below
2005 levels, the main elements of climate
policy remain unannounced. That said,
Canada has conveyed its preferences through
its Turning the Corner plan, where its cap-
and-trade aspirations are focused on the large
industrial emitters with flexibility
mechanisms that include a safety valve
technology fund that ends well before 2020,
domestic offsets and international offsets
limited to 10 percent. US aspirations, as
communicated through the ACESA and the
APA would establish an economy-wide cap-
and-trade program with very generous
international offset limits and other
flexibility mechanisms such as banking and
borrowing. We assess variations on this
scenario  and  conclude that even with
aligned reduction targets, carbon policies
would result in significantly higher costs on
the Canadian economy relative to the US
under current policy configurations. 
(2) Same targets with comparable climate
policies.This scenario  explores what would
happen if Canada implemented a policy
comparable to the US ACESA or the APA
with a view to harmonizing policy and
avoiding border carbon measures. The main| 12 Commentary 307
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17 30 percent is a compromise between ACESA, which allows up to 50 percent international offsets  and the APA, which allows 25 percent
international offsets. However, under both of these Acts, if the domestic offset ceiling is not reached, up to 50 percent can then be obtained
internationally. 
policy elements include full coverage of all
emissions, 30 percent international offsets
17
and unlimited domestic offsets. We assess
both the Canada-alone and linked-allowance
approaches. The scenario reveals that linked
permit trade is extremely beneficial to
industrial emitters, both in terms of cost and
impacts on exports. The trade-off is that
lower carbon prices will reduce incentives for
innovation and hence increase longer term
costs of deeper emission reductions. 
(3) Go it alone with same carbon prices.This is
a final alternative that can be implemented if
trading with the US is not feasible, yet
competitiveness concerns remain. Under this
scenario, the US permit price sets a safety
valve price that limits Canadian cost
exposure, with payments to a technology
fund to further technology research,
development and deployment. This scenario
concludes that harmonizing carbon prices
may lower costs but, to the extent that a
safety valve is used, lower emission reductions
can jeopardize the ability of Canada to meet
emissions reduction targets on its own. 
1. Same Targets but Different Policies 
Variations on this scenario look at the implications
of harmonizing targets, but with diverging
elements of cap-and-trade design between Canada
and the US. The alternative policies are drawn
from stylized versions of the leading recently
proposed climate polices in Canada and the
United States: a Canadian cap-and-trade system
based on elements of the government of Canada’s
Regulatory Framework and a US cap-and-trade
system based on ACESA and the APA (Table 1).
Notably, we do not model the Canadian intensity
standard under TTC, but instead assume a hard
cap subject to compliance mechanisms. We focus
on 2020 to allow for short-term uncertainty in
policy implementation, but also to keep the
analytics straightforward by not having to make
assumptions about very long-term actions. These
two proposed national policies serve as the
benchmarks used to assess the implications under
scenarios with and without linked trade.   
The alternatives include:
￿  Old and new targets with elements of TTC
(old/new targets Canada alone). In this
approach the target reduction for industrial
emitters, comprising about 42 percent of all
Canadian emissions in 2020 is 20 percent
below 2006 levels (old, TTC plan) and 17
percent below 2005 levels (new, as of January
2010). Unlike the intensity standard in TTC,
the approach is modeled as a hard cap. Similar
to TTC, compliance options include trade
between covered sectors, unlimited domestic
offsets and 10 percent from international offsets.
Although TTC foresees a  technology fund, it
was proposed to be phased out in 2017, so given
our model’s focus in 2020, we assume that the
technology fund safety valve is not a compliance
option in this scenario. We do include this
safety-valve option in later cases. 
￿  United States alone under the proposed
ACESA approach. This approach covers about
85 percent of all US emissions with a cap by
2020 at a level that is 17 percent below 2005
levels. The United States implements
ACESA/APA as described in Table 1, with 40
percent of total compliance from offsets and
the remaining gap to the target level attained
through domestic abatement including
domestic offsets. The allowance price ceiling of
US $35 per tonne under APA is a noticeable
difference with ACESA. 
￿  Canada and the United States linked through
cross-border allowance trade. Both policies are
then linked through cross-border allowance trade. 
It would seem that the compliance targets in the
US and Canadian “go-it-alone” policies of acting
independently are not comparable given the
significantly lower coverage under currentCommentary 307 | 13
Canadian policy. The Canadian focus on industrial
emitters covers just 42 percent of national emissions
and the United States covers 85 percent (Table 2).
However, overall coverage does not tell the whole
story. Despite harmonized targets, Canada requires a
larger percentage reduction from its large industrial
energy users and producers (which we call
industrials) by 2020 than the United States
demands from these sectors, given a rising level of
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions relative to their
American counterparts and the fixed baseline target
in 2005. This places a somewhat greater reduction
obligation on Canadian industry, which must
achieve approximately a 20 percent reduction, as
opposed to the US target of 17 percent relative to
2020 BAU emissions.
18 In effect, the industrials
must do more in 2020, and Canada’s industrials are
a larger share of the total emissions relative to the
United States. This trend is exacerbated under the old
Canadian targets, which require about 9 Mt of CO2
more from the industrials and total about 3 percent of
their forecast 2020 emissions.
The main elements of the two countries’
approaches differ primarily on coverage and use of
international offsets, but the limit on international
offsets drives the major compliance differences (Table
3). Despite much broader policy coverage in the
United States, the higher limit on international
offsets reduces the level of internal US abatement. As
a share of national emissions, domestic abatement
19
is less in the United States than in Canada, but
international allowance purchases are much larger
relatively. Under the Canadian policy, this lower
international limit shifts compliance toward more
domestic offsets relative to the United States and
more abatement from the covered sectors.
20
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18 Energy Information Administration (2009). 
19 Domestic offsets plus covered sector reductions.
20 We assume Canada is a price taker for international offsets and the United States is the price setter, given their large relative demand. At the US
allowance price, the supply of international allowances is bound by the limit on international offsets. 
Table 2:  Coverage and Targets, 2020 Canada Old and New Targets and the US ACESA
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Table 3: Independent Policies without Allowance Trade, 2020 Compliance and Abatement Canada Old and
New Targets and the US ACESA










% shares of total
abatement
55 35 10
Mt 76 42 27 8
Canada: New
Targets  
% shares of total
abatement
53 37 10
Mt 67 35 25 7
US: ACESA % shares of total
abatement
46 25 29
Mt 970 446 247 277
Table 4: Independent Policies with Allowance Trade, 2020 Compliance and Abatement for Covered Sectors
Canada Old and New Targets and ACESA
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.









% shares of total
abatement
37 30 10 23
Mt 28 23 8 17
Canada: New
Targets  
% shares of total
abatement
34 33 10 23
Mt 23 22 7 15
US: ACESA % shares of total
abatement
46 26 29 -2
Mt 441 251 277 -15Commentary 307 | 15
With allowance trading enabled, cross-border
trade reduces abatement from Canadian
industrials significantly, and electricity in
particular, as these entities are no longer net sellers
of allowances. The oil and gas industry is the
major net purchaser of allowances, while the US
electricity sector is a net seller. With cross-border
allowance trade, the additional US compliance
conducted to sell allowances to Canada is about 2
percent of the national target, whereas for Canada
net purchases are about 23 percent of compliance
(Table 4 and Figure 1).
Although the two policies deliver comparable
reductions from the covered sectors, the same
cannot be said for the economic implications of
approaches with the same targets but different
policies. Our assessment suggests that allowance
prices would be much higher in Canada than in
the United States without linkage, on the order
of 40 percent more (Table 5). The total costs of
the policies, which include the cost of domestic
abatement plus allowances bought internation-
ally, are estimated to be about $1.7 billion for
Canada and $18.5 billion for the US (ACESA in
Table 5). As a share of GDP, the Canadian policy
costs are about equal to those in the United States,
even though total domestic emission reductions
are lower. This finding confirms a common view
that Canadian abatement costs are higher than
those in the US, although this conclusion may not
hold at higher levels of reductions where carbon
capture and storage becomes economic. 
Although these differences can be attributed to
different international offset limits, emissions
growth in Canada also is a factor. In the emission
forecasts we use, US-covered emissions remain
more or less flat while Canadian-covered emissions
grow roughly 7 percent between now and 2020.
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Cross border trade  International offsets Domestic offsets Covered abatement
Figure 2: Emissions and Compliance, Same Targets (17 percent) Independent Policies With and Without
Linked Allowance Trade
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.| 16 Commentary 307
With comparable fixed-base-year targets (i.e.,
reductions below 2005), Canadian firms must take
more action to hit the target, which further drives
up allowance prices.
21
Linked allowance trading under these approaches
reduces the Canadian allowance price, bringing it
close to the prevailing US market price, which serves
to lower overall compliance costs by about 25
percent in Canada. Covered entities in Canada in
effect benefit from the generous US offset limits
under linked trade, which keeps allowance prices and
costs low.  US compliance costs would likely increase
slightly, given the small increase in the allowance
price due to Canadian demand for allowances.
Meanwhile, the total cost of the policy for Canada
falls to GDP shares below that of the United States,
but emissions coverage is less, as is the quantity of
reduced emissions (Table 5). Reducing the Canadian
target drops the Canada alone scenario permit prices
from $60 to $49 per tonne. 
Although allowance flows are to the United
States, with capital leaving Canada, the benefits
from avoided carbon costs more than outweigh the
loss in capital. The cross-border financial flows out
of Canada to import allowances are about $500
million in 2020, which avoids additional costs
above this transfer of about $300 million if cross-
border allowance trade is not present. 
The lower compliance costs with allowance trade
reduce adverse macroeconomic impacts in Canada.
With permit trade, the impact on national GDP is
halved, from about 0.37 percent in 2020 down to
0.2 percent (Table 6). Output is also less impacted
with linking. Importantly, linking significantly
reduces competitiveness impacts by smoothing
differences in the price of traded goods. With
similar carbon prices in Canada and the US through
linking, the change in Canadian net exports drops
significantly from 0.18 percent in the unlinked
scenario to 0.03 percent in the linked approach.
This is a small net effect. 
The sector impacts are not uniform, with some
winning and some losing under linking (Table 7).
Clear winners are Canadian allowance buyers,
notably in the oil and gas industry, who see
compliance costs fall, as measured by sector GDP
impacts.
22 However, Canadian allowance sellers
suffer, as US allowance imports displace allowance
sales from sectors such as electricity. Offset providers
are also worse off, as they see the value of their
allowance sales more than halved because of the
lower allowance price under a linked cap-and-trade
system. Greater access to the US market may benefit
Canadian offset sellers; however, they must then
compete with international and domestic US offsets. 
2. Same Targets with Comparable
Climate Policies
Threats of trade sanctions under ACESA have led
many to argue that Canada should implement a
policy equivalent to the US to avoid border carbon
adjustments. To demonstrate equivalent policy,
and possibly avoid trade sanctions, Canada could
implement policy according to the main elements
of ACESA, with comparable coverage, compliance
targets, and flexibility mechanisms. In this group
of scenarios, we investigate the implications for
Canada of implementing an ACESA style cap-and-
trade system under linked and unlinked scenarios. 
Implementing a policy similar to the ACESA in
Canada would require the expanded coverage of
the now defunct TTC policy to buildings,
transportation, other manufacturing, and
agriculture (not carbon sequestration).
23 This
policy coverage would equal about 90 percent of
Canadian emissions in 2020 or 681 Mt from a
forecast baseline of 741 Mt, with a target of about
552 Mt. International offsets would also need to
be expanded from current limits of about 10
percent to roughly 30 percent as under ACESA,
with a maximum allowable quantity of about 46
Mt. As with the defunct TTC policy, ACESA
allows generous domestic offsets. As above, we
model firms as able to trade allowances
domestically in an unlinked scenario and across
borders in an linked scenario. 
C.D. Howe Institute
21 We discuss the implications of relative abatement cost in later scenarios. 
22 GDP is at basic prices and therefore includes indirect taxes including the allowance value. 
23 Output based allocations are used for all emitters, although the ACESA carves out petroleum refining. Commentary 307 | 17
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Table 6: Canadian Macroeconomic Impacts in 2020 Independent Policies and Allowance Trade, Same Targets
(17 percent) Differing Policies 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.
Percent Change Relative to No Policy Case
Canada GDP Net Exports Gross Output
Without Permit Trade -0.37 -0.17 -0.57
With Permit Trade -0.20 -0.03 -0.25
Percent Change in GDP in Canada Relative to No Policy Case
Sector Without Permit Trade With Permit Trade
Oil and Gas -6.4 -4.0
Mining -2.9 -1.1
Petroleum Refining -1.3 -0.9
Other Manufacturing -1.1 -0.4
Industrial Minerals -0.7 -0.2
Iron and Steel  -2.2 -0.7
Pulp and Paper 5.2 3.3
Electricity 9.2 6.0
Table 7: 2020 Sector GDP Impacts in Canada Same Targets Different Policies 
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.
Table 5: 2020 Compliance Costs Independent Policies With and Without Allowance Trade Canada New Targets
and the US ACESA
a Using 2008 GDP based on PPP from the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 2008. This is total compliance cost divided by 2008 GDP. 
b This is very close to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimate of $32 US. 
c The APA price ceiling of $35 is not reached under these scenarios.












Canada: New Targets   $49 $1.7 0.13
US: ACESA $30b $18.5 0.13
Independent Policies
with Allowance Trade
Canada: New Targets  
$31c
$1.4 0.10
US: ACESA $19.1 0.13| 18 Commentary 307
In a scenario with comparable climate policies in
Canada and the US, where Canada implements the
main elements of the ACESA, but without Canada-
US trade in permits, domestic abatement contributes
significantly, or slightly more than 50 percent of total
compliance (Figure 3). As the price of domestic
offsets is driven up, supply potentials in Canada are
reached at about 20 percent of compliance while the
international offset limit is also reached.
24
With Canada-US permit trade under
comparable policies, Canadian purchases of US
allowances significantly reduces covered sector
abatement in Canada. Covered-sector abatement
in Canada drops from 53 percent to less than 30
percent of compliance relative to the comparable
policies alone scenario, with another 30 percent
compliance obtained from allowance imports from
the US (Figure 4). Canadian offset providers also
supply less as domestic offset purchases fall. With a
full third of compliance obtained from allowance
trade with the US, the abatement cost differentials
between the two countries, at least under these
scenarios, would suggest that linked trade is a very
important flexibility mechanism.
The costs of the ‘Canada alone’ and ‘comparable
policies’ scenario is higher than the previous
Canada alone scenario with limited coverage of
industrial emitters, despite the generous offsets
limit primarily due to the policy being expanded to
cover buildings and transportation.
25 Although the
international offsets limit of 30 percent puts
downward pressure on the Canadian allowance
price,
26 it is countervailed as abatement costs in the
buildings and transportation sectors puts upward
pressure on allowance prices. The net result of the
expanded coverage, even with the international
offsets limit of 30 percent, is an allowance price of
$59 per tonne. Total costs are then about $4.3
billion which is about 0.3 percent of GDP. This
compares to the US under the same scenario that
has costs of about 0.1  percent of GDP with an
allowance price of $30 per tonne. 
Linking the two countries through allowance
trade then lowers allowance prices and total costs
in Canada considerably (Table 8). But as expected
the US allowance price under a linked system is
slightly higher reflecting increased Canadian
demand, although it is only marginally higher.
This then increases the US policy costs, which are
still well below the Canadian total costs as a share
of GDP. Allowance purchases by Canada are about
$1.2 billion annually, which avoids an additional
$900 million in compliance costs relative to the
same scenario with no linking. 
Under this “ACESA type” scenario with no
allowance trade, Canadian GDP drops in the order
of 1.7 percent, while net exports fall 0.7 percent.
These effects are partially ameliorated with
allowance trade, with GDP losses more than halved
(Table 9). Linking reduces differences in the market
prices of competing Canadian and US goods and it
is the export sectors that benefits most. 
While the short-term economic benefits of
linking seem assured, a long-term evaluation
would need to take into account the role of
Canadian innovation and learning-by-doing,
which are outside the scope of our modeling.
Lower allowance prices under linking and outflows
of capital to finance abatement technology in the
US would reduce Canadian incentives to innovate,
which could leave Canadian industry less prepared
for deeper emission reductions that may be
necessary in the future. Thus, in the next scenario,
we consider an alignment option that generates
funds for addressing future technology needs.
3. Canada Alone with the Same
Carbon Prices 
In this scenario, Canada keeps its current policy
preferences, with coverage of industrial emitters
and a 10 percent international offset limit, but
implements a price limit equal to the US allowance
price. The price limit on the scenario  is
C.D. Howe Institute
24 We assume international offset supply prices are set by US demand, which in turn is a function of US compliance with our stylized version of
ACESA. The international offset price is $30 per tonne, and since this is lower than the unlinked price, offsets are fully subscribed. The
scenario allowance price is provided below. 
25 These sectors are known to have higher compliance costs relative to the industrial emitters for the same level of reductions. 
26 Recall we assume the US is the price setter for international offsets, with the US allowance price setting the international offsets price. Canada
is then a price taker for international offsets. In effect, the US and international markets are in equilibrium. Commentary 307 | 19
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implemented as a technology fund that can be
accessed at US allowance prices as estimated above
from US alone scenario under ACESA ($30 per
tonne). The compliance target remains a 17
percent reduction below 2005 emission levels in
2020, with covered emissions about 329 Mt and  a
compliance target of 266 Mt, resulting in a 9
percent reduction in national emissions.
The motivations for including this scenario are
twofold. First, Canada-US allowance trade may
not become a reality for any number of reasons,
such as political reticence in the US or the inability
to come to agreement on policy architecture.
Second, the lower incentive to innovate under
allowance trading creates a long-term risk both to
achieving targets and to minimizing policy costs.
The scenario is therefore designed to show that
even in the absence of allowance trade with the
US, climate policy costs can be lowered to
minimize competitiveness impacts through
aligning carbon prices while bolstering the
incentive to innovate through earmarking the
savings to the technology fund. The trade-off is













Figure 3: Emissions and Compliance Without Permit Trade, Same Targets and Comparable Policy















Figure 4: Emissions and Compliance With Permit Trade, Same Targets and Comparable Policy
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technology fund would lead to uncertain and
delayed emission reductions. 
If Canada were to set a technology fund price
above the US ACESA price of $30,
27 the
simulations suggest it would be readily accessed by
emitters.
28 With the lower price comes less domestic
abatement from the covered industrial energy users
and producers, with abatement totaling 34 percent
of compliance for covered sectors. Domestic offset
supplies are somewhat insensitive to the price drop
and still supply significant levels of compliance
(Figure 5). The technology fund is heavily
subscribed, accounting for 22 percent of compliance,
which takes away significantly from domestic
abatement. These effects on abatement are similar to
those with linked trade, but the additional
compliance payments are put into the fund rather
than used to buy additional abatement in the United
States (or abroad). 
As expected, aligning carbon prices with the United
States through a technology fund lowers overall costs,
with allowance prices almost halved. This lowers
overall costs to about 0.1 percent of GDP. With the
technology fund capturing a large share of total
compliance, fund payments  are about $500 million.
This is equal to the cross-border allowance flows under
the linked scenarios described above.
One oft-cited argument against allowance
purchases from outside national or provincial
borders is that money leaves the jurisdiction, thereby
lowering the level of economic activity locally. In
our simulations, this is not an issue nationally, where
C.D. Howe Institute
27 Estimated as above so that it acts like a true safety valve.
28 See Table 5 where in the same scenario (targets, coverage, etc.)  but with no flexibility the allowance price is $49 per tonne. 
Table 8: Policy Costs in 2020 Same Targets and Comparable Policies
Allowance Price Total Cost 
($Billion CDN)
Costs as a Share 
Of 2008 GDP
Canada US Canada US Canada US
Canada: Comparable Independent Policy $59 $4.4 0.33%
US: Comparable Independent Policy $30 $18.5 0.13%
Canada: Comparable Linked Policiesa $32 $3.5 0.27%
US: Comparable Linked Policies $32 $19.7 0.14%
a Canada expanded coverage to all emissions
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.
Table 9: Macroeconomic Impacts in Canada in 2020 Same Targets and Comparable Policies
Source: Authors’ calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.
Percent Change Relative to No Policy Case
Comparable Policies Gross Output National GDP Net Exports
Without Permit Trade -1.67 -1.42 -0.74
With Permit Trade -0.79 -0.71 -0.30Commentary 307 | 21
GDP impacts are identical when costs are contained
using a technology fund or cross-border allowance
imports. But regionally there are differences. In
Alberta, for example, the simulations suggest that a
when the technology fund is spent locally to
subsidize carbon capture and storage, the GDP cost
impact is lower, with a reduction in GDP by 1.4
percent relative to 2.4 percent if allowances were
instead imported from the US. 
This scenario highlights that it is the alignment
of prices that is the larger determinant of GDP
impact and cost, and not whether that alignment
comes through linking allowance trade with the
United States. Having carbon reductions come
from lower cost sources is beneficial
29 (at least from
an economic perspective), regardless of the form of
the cost containment. One important difference,
however, is the loss of the price signal with linking
or alignment, where the lower carbon price sets
lower expectations, thereby driving less technology
deployment and hence innovation to reduce
emissions. In this regard, the technology fund,
with the ability to spur domestic innovation,
especially if Canada is seeking deeper reductions in
the longer-term, is an important distinction in the
choice of choosing between cross-border allowance
purchases and domestic spending. However, one
can question the wisdom of earmarking all these
funds to specific technologies, like carbon capture
and storage, or of relying solely on the fund for
financing climate-related activities outside the cap.
Appropriate levels of funding should first be
determined by merit, based on what is a cost-
effective portfolio of investments to prepare
Canada for the future low-carbon economy. At the
proposed safety valve price and sector coverage, the
transfers to the technology fund would be $450
million annually in 2020 – however, that amount
could be much larger (as would reductions) if
coverage were expanded economy-wide.
What is constant across all scenarios is the use of
cost-containment measures by Canadian
industrials. Under scenarios where cost
containment is available, be it international offsets,
cross-border trade, a technology fund, or another
form of safety valve, these opportunities will be
fully subscribed. Indeed, we see these options as
substitutes, reducing domestic abatement to more
or less similar degrees. 
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 















Figure 5: Equivalency on Price with TTC: Emissions and Compliance
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Conclusions 
Canada has harmonized its targets with the US
and says it will harmonize policy as well. But our
assessment indicates this is a high-risk strategy for
three reasons. 
￿  First, the strong economic rationale for linking
allowance-trading systems with the US is that
Canada has harmonized targets with the US. At
these targets, Canada’s abatement costs are likely
to be significantly higher than those in the US,
and Canada’s emissions are growing faster,
making the costs of harmonized targets yet more
expensive in Canada. Importing permits from
the US under uneven emissions growth and
abatement costs will smooth relative carbon
prices and lower short-term costs in Canada.
With harmonized targets from the same fixed
base year, large financial outflows to the US
under linked allowance trade can be expected. In
particular, the oil and gas sectors in Canada will
seek lower cost abatement opportunities abroad,
while the US electricity sector expands its
abatement in response. From a US perspective,
however, these financial flows and price changes
are relatively small. 
￿  Second, the lower allowance price with cross-
border allowance trade decreases the incentive
to develop and deploy important backstop
technologies, notably carbon capture and
storage. If Canada is indeed seeking more
GHG reductions in the future, as Canada’s
longer-term aspirational 2050 targets would
imply,
30 transformative technologies need
innovation. But Canada-US allowance trade
lowers allowance prices significantly in Canada,
and hence lowers learning by doing and returns
to domestic innovation. This is particularly a
concern for carbon capture and storage in the
oil and gas sector. This sector is the high cost of
abatement sector in Canada with carbon
capture providing an important long-term
abatement opportunity. But with allowance
prices forecast to be about $31 per tonne in
2020 under allowance trade with the US, there
is little private incentive to develop and test
high-cost technologies, that may be needed to
meet future, deeper reduction targets. This will
then likely increase the overall costs of long-
term reductions in Canada. Innovation in
carbon capture – not to mention energy
efficiency, renewables, and other carbon-
reducing technologies – could be supplemented
with government expenditures, but those
would need a financing mechanism.
￿  Third, the US has not expressed much interest in
linking, and waiting for an explicit policy would
result in delay. With linked permit trade, US costs
rise, which then raises questions about the
acceptability of linked trade to the US, especially
during the initial development phase of a US
system when cost concerns are so acute. Our
analysis indicates that Canada-US allowance trade
will increase US costs by about $1 billion
annually or about 5 percent. If Canada were to
delay its entire policy, waiting for the US to
sanction linking, it will necessarily delay the
deployment of low emitting capital making
longer-term policy costs more expensive.
However, since Canada is likely a buyer of
allowances, Canada would not necessarily need
the US to formally approve linked markets;
Canada could merely allow purchased US
allowances to be surrendered for compliance in
the Canadian system. The APA does have trading
regulations intended to limit speculation, but it is
not clear whether that would ultimately hamper
allowance purchases by non-US regulated entities.
Instead of linked permit trade, a policy of
harmonizing allowance prices and policy coverage,
rather than specific targets or mechanisms, is a
largely equivalent and simpler option with several
attractive properties. This policy should alleviate
competitiveness concerns, as all Canadian sectors
would face comparable cost conditions to their US
counterparts and comparable incentives for carbon
reductions.
31 Under such a system, Canada would
peg its domestic carbon price in a domestic cap-
C.D. Howe Institute
30 See Government of Canada News Release, March 10, 2008. Government Delivers Details of Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Framework.
http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-1&news=B2B42466-B768-424C-9A5B-6D59C2AE1C36
31 Price equivalency should be sufficient to avoid border adjustments; in ACESA the purpose of the International Reserve Allowance Program is
to minimize “the likelihood of carbon leakage as a result of differences between (A) the direct and indirect costs of complying with section
722; and (B) the direct and indirect costs, if any, of complying in other countries with greenhouse gas regulatory programs... . ”Commentary 307 | 23
and-trade system to that of the US through the use
of a price ceiling. By using a rolling average, price
volatility would be limited. Firms would use the
price ceiling to make decisions on whether to abate
internally, buy permits or make payments to a
technology fund. If the Canadian allowance price
rose to the ceiling level, Canadian emitters would
likely prefer to make compliance payments to the
Canadian government. The amount of those
payments will ultimately depend on the target
chosen for Canada. Given that the price ceiling
would lessen the incentive to innovate, part of the
compliance payments could then be used to incent
technology, especially carbon capture and storage.
Because the technology fund payments would not
result in real emission reductions, at least not
initially, the hard cap would in effect be relaxed.
This could be partly addressed through using some
of the technology fund payments to buy additional
offsets, either domestic or international. Another
approach would be to borrow some portion of the
cap from the future thereby creating a carbon debt
that would make the cap more stringent in later
periods. In any case, if the chosen targets reflect
high aspirations, fund payments are likely to be
substantial, requiring careful institutional
management to invest appropriately in a wide
range of climate-related activities.
In exploring the implications of linked cap-and-
trade systems between Canada and the US, one
key question arose:  is linked allowance trade the
best policy for Canada?  Our assessment indicates
that linked allowance trade with the US is not
necessarily the best policy for Canada to pursue
while the US develops its own system. Instead,
Canada should not delay and should forge ahead
with its own system, while minimizing the risk of
getting out of step with the US, notably on relative
carbon prices. A policy of go it alone with similar
carbon price expectations and a targeted
innovation agenda seems to be a low-risk strategy.
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32 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/index.html
We first use the CIMS energy technology
model to explore the linked and unlinked
allowance trade scenarios in 2020. CIMS is
maintained by researchers at Simon Fraser
University. CIMS provides indicators of
abatement costs and potential, given coverage,
stringency, and limits on offsets. This
determines the allowance price and the
compliance shortfall that international offsets
can fill, subject to limits.
CIMS simulates the technological evolution
of fixed capital stocks in Canada (such as
buildings, vehicles, and equipment) and the
resulting effect on costs, energy use, emissions,
and other material flows of various carbon
polices such as pricing and standards. With the
carbon policy, old stocks are retrofitted to reflect
the increased cost of carbon while new and less
emission-intensive capital stocks are acquired at
retirement and with growth in stock demand
(e.g., rising electricity demand). Market shares
of technologies competing to meet new stock
demands with the carbon policy are determined
by standard financial factors as well as
behavioral parameters from empirical research
on consumer and business technology
preferences. 
To supplement CIMS, and to study the
macroeconomic implications for Canada of
carbon polices, we use a static computable
general equilibrium and emissions model,
GEEM. The allowance prices and flows that
emerge from CIMS are then fed into GEEM to
calculate the macroeconomic outcomes.
The version of GEEM used for this paper is a
static general equilibrium model of the
Canadian economy in 2020. In the model, a
representative household supplies labor and
capital to industrial sectors. The industrial
sectors supply intermediate inputs to one
another, and final commodities to the
household. Imports and exports to the rest of
the world are explicitly modeled. All markets
interact through relative producer and consumer
prices with policy shocks changing these prices,
leading to new equilibriums in the various
markets. GEEM was developed based on a
collaborative research effort between Nic Rivers,
Chris Bataille and Jotham Peters. 
Finally, to determine the implications of
linked allowance trade between Canada and the
US, we developed a partial equilibrium model of
Canada-US allowance trading.
We made abatement choices in the model that
minimize compliance costs subject to emission
reduction targets, policy coverage, and cost-
containment measures such as offsets. The
model then solves for the equilibrium allowance
price in 2020, subject to sector abatement
responses and compliance choices. Allowance
flows, both between sectors and countries, are
then a function of the mix of compliance that
comes from abatement and the compliance
mechanisms. Canadian abatement cost curves
are developed from CIMS. US abatement cost
curves are from 10 model runs of H.R. 2454
(Waxman-Markey) completed by the Energy
Information Administration (EIA).
US abatement responses are developed from
the EIA Runs of H.R. 2454. Abatement
responses at the various carbon prices are used
to specify a series of marginal abatement cost
curves from 10 of the 11 runs posted.
32 The
“high banking” scenario was not used due to
large additions in current years with the banking
provision. Table A1 provides an overview of the
cost curves for Canada and the United States.
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United States United States Canada Canada
Slope Intercept Slope Intercept
Residential 3.933 14.530 0.044 0.069
Commercial 4.326 9.986 0.063 -0.160
Chemicals 0.548 8.529 0.036 -0.110
Industrial Minerals  0.101 4.975 0.019 -0.026
Iron and Steel 0.217 7.681 0.006 -0.070
Metal Smelting  0.123 3.693 0.002 0.016
Refining 0.299 0.698 0.042 -0.150
Mining,  Oil and Gas  0.025 9.313 0.308 2.198
Pulp and Paper  0.195 6.427 0.001 0.027
Other Manufacturing 1.213 11.931 0.046 0.055
Agriculture 0.180 9.289 0.023 1.973
Transportation 0.520 10.983 0.420 -2.943
Electricity 7.656 172.638 0.233 1.000
Domestic Offsets (Agriculture) 4.563 110.988 0.165 -0.312
Waste 0.023 20.930
Linear Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for Canada and the US 2005 $CDN
Source: Authors' calculations derived from CIMS, GEEM and EIA models.
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